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REWARDING TRESPASS & OTHER
ENIGMAS:  THE STRANGE WORLD OF
SELF-EXCLUSION & CASINO LIABILITY
Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed*
& Meredith A. Harper**
In this paper, the authors address many of the tortious and contractual issues
associated with the liability of casinos to problem gamblers.  The issues in tort are
analyzed through the traditional elements of the action – duty of care, standard of
care, proximity, and recognizable loss.  Under contract law, the authors examine the
problems associated with consideration and mental capacity when problem gamblers
sign a contractual undertaking to be excluded from casinos and other gaming
venues.
Many of the references cited in this work relate to the Province of Ontario
because an earlier article (and report) on the issue of problem gambling posited that
Ontario’s gaming venues owed a duty of care to problem gamblers.  However, many
of the basic principles of contract law and tort law raised within this paper will be
applicable throughout the Commonwealth and the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
Problem gambling is a complex issue driven by emotive discourse.  It pits
gaudy, extravagant casinos, against “mentally ill” problem gamblers.  Outside
of the casino industry itself, there is often little sympathy for the casino.  This
paper seeks to address this imbalance by refuting the claim that problem gam-
blers have a viable claim in tort against casinos (and other gaming venues1).  It
also seeks to address the contractual liability, if any, of casinos to self-identi-
fied problem gamblers who have signed a voluntary self-exclusion agreement
whereby the casino undertakes to exclude the problem gambler from its
premises.2
* Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
Windsor, Faculty of Law.  The authors would like to congratulate the students and faculty at
the William S. Boyd School of Law at UNLV for their hard work and vision in launching
this journal.  We wish them tremendous success.
** Meredith A. Harper is an alumnus of the University of Windsor, Faculty of Law (Class
of 2010).
1 For convenience, we use the term “casino” to mean traditional casinos, race tracks, bingos,
and other gaming venues.
2 Under Ontario’s voluntary self-exclusion program, it is problem gamblers who self-iden-
tify and sign an undertaking, the “Request to be Placed on a List of Self-Excluded Persons
and Release,” that they wish to be excluded from all Ontario gaming venues for an indefinite
period of time. See infra App. A, Over Your Limit 1 (obtained in person from Caesar’s
Windsor Responsible Gaming Information Centre on Aug. 23, 2008) (hereinafter List, or
Release, as the context dictates).
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Many of the references cited in this work will relate to the Province of
Ontario because an earlier article (and report) on the issue of problem gam-
bling3 dealt specifically with the liability of Ontario’s gaming venues to prob-
lem gamblers.4  However, many of the basic principles of tort law and contract
law raised within this article are applicable to the Commonwealth and the
United States.  The issues in tort are analyzed through the traditional elements
of the action – duty of care, standard of care, proximity, and recognizable loss.
We also offer a critique of Justice Macdonald’s unfortunate obiter comments in
Treyes v. Ontario Lottery & Gaming Corporation.5 Issues in contract will also
be examined.  The issues in contract (namely, consideration and mental capac-
ity) arise from self-identified problem gamblers who have signed a contractual
undertaking to be excluded from casinos.
II. PROBLEM GAMBLING VS. PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING
All forms of writing – articles, reports, and even legal judgments – are
written with some measure of equivocation.  The difference between “problem
gambling” and “pathological gambling” is one such equivocation that is rarely
addressed in legal literature.
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM-IV-TR”), published by the American Psychiatric Association,
“[p]athological gambling (PG) is characterized by persistent and progressive
gambling behavior despite negative consequences and/or the desire to
quit . . . .”6  Pathological gambling is considered to be an impulse control disor-
der, as defined in the DSM-IV-TR, where the gambler seeks a small, short-term
gain at the expense of a large, long-term loss.7  Impulse control disorders are
considered to be part of the obsessive-compulsive disorder spectrum8 and not
an addiction or addictive disorder per se.9
3 William V. Sasso & Jasminka Kalajdzic, Do Ontario and Its Gaming Venues Owe a Duty
of Care to Problem Gamblers?, 10 GAMING L. REV. 552 (2006); see also Andrew Chung,
Casinos Not Taking Chances in Court; Provincial Agency Settling Cases Brought by Prob-
lem Gamblers to Avoid Setting Precedents, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 5, 2007, at A01, available
at www.thestar.com/printArticle/243348 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (“[T]he OLG [Ontario
Lottery and Gaming Corporation] would likely be found liable to a person who signed a self-
exclusion contract and was permitted to re-enter [a gaming venue] and play anyway.”) (inter-
nal quotations omitted)).
4 But see Emir A. C. Mohammed, The Problem with Problem Gaming:  A Response to
Sasso and Kalajdzic, in Defense of the Gaming Industry, 12 GAMING L. REV. 340 (2008)
(critiquing Sasso & Kalajdzic’s article and the report it was based on); Jamie Cameron,
Problem Gamblers and the Duty of Care:  A Response to Sasso and Kalajdzic, 11 GAMING
L. REV. 554 (2007) (examining the soundness of the claim that the province and its gaming
revenues can be held responsible for gambling losses).
5 Treyes v. Ontario Lottery & Gaming Corp., [2007] 49 C.P.C. (6th) 400 (Can.).
6 David Crockford et al., Prevalence of Problem and Pathological Gambling in Parkinson’s
Disease, 24 J. GAMBLING STUDY 411, 412 (2008).
7 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS 671-74 (4th ed. text rev. 2000).
8 Id. at 663 (“Pathological Gambling” is classified as a type of “Impulse-control disorders
not elsewhere classified”).
9 See, e.g., Nancy M. Petry, Should the Scope of Addictive Behaviors Be Broadened to
Include Pathological Gambling?, 101 ADDICTION 152 (2006) (Supp. 1) (examining the
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Problem gambling, on the other hand, is defined by whether harm is
experienced by the gambler or others, rather than by the gambler’s behaviour.
According to the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (“CPGI”)10 – whose
“goal was to develop a new, more meaningful measure of problem gambling
for use in general population surveys, one that reflected a more holistic view of
gambling, and included more indicators of social context”11 – problem gam-
bling can be generally identified based on demographic information and the
extent of involvement (e.g. types of games, frequency of play, amount spent) in
gambling activities.12 The categories of gamblers identified by these diagnos-
tic groupings are:  non-gambling, non-problem gambling, low risk gambling,
moderate risk gambling, and problem gambling.13  The CPGI analysis includes
forty-six variables.14 Problem gambling, at the demographic level, requires a
score between eight and twenty-seven on the CPGI and identifies gamblers
“who have experienced adverse consequences from their gambling, and may
have lost control of their behaviour.”15 For problem gamblers, “involvement in
gambling can be at any level, but is likely to be heavy.”16 This demographic
group is more likely to experience cognitive distortion – whereby a negative
spin is placed on all thoughts and experiences, often leading to depression.17
Based on the CPGI, the Problem Gambling Severity Index (“PGSI”) was
developed as a diagnostic tool for use by health care professionals.18  The PGSI
features nine questions, each with a weighting of zero to three points.19  A
score of zero indicates non-problem gambling; a score of one or two indicates a
low level of problems with few or no identified negative consequences; a score
of three to seven indicates a moderate level of problems leading to some nega-
tive consequences; and a score of eight or more indicates problem gambling
with negative consequences and a possible loss of control.20  Indeed, a score of
eight or more might indicate pathological gambling, but not necessarily.  In
sum, all pathological gambling is a form of problem gambling, but not vice
versa.
advantages and disadvantages of expanding addictive disorders to include pathological
gambling).
10 Jackie Ferris & Harold Wynne, Canadian Centre of Substance Abuse, The Canadian
Problem Gambling Index:  Final Report (2001) [hereinafter CPGI Final Report].
11 Id. at *6.
12 Id.
13 Id. at *2.
14 Id. at *18.
15 Id. at *30.
16 Id.
17 See generally AARON T. BECK, COGNITIVE THERAPY AND THE EMOTIONAL DISORDERS
(1975).
18 Katherine Marshall & Harold Wynne, Fighting the Odds, PERSPECTIVES ON LABOUR &
INCOME, 5-13 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/studies-etudes/75-001/
archive/2003/5018524-eng.pdf.
19 Problem Gambling Severity Index, Problem Gaming Project, The Centre for Addiction
and Mental Health, available at http://www.problemgambling.ca/EN/Documents/
ProblemGamblingSeverityIndex.pdf.
20 Id.
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III. THE LIABILITY IN TORT TO PROBLEM GAMBLERS
In assessing whether casinos are liable to problem gamblers in tort law,
courts traditionally apply the law of negligence.  However, the law of negli-
gence serves to create legal disincentives to risk-creating behaviour.21  Ascrib-
ing a duty of care to a legally blameless party, like a casino, simply because it
is economically, socially, or politically convenient to do so, would work against
the very principles that the law of negligence is based upon.
Actions in negligence must satisfy the usual elements.22  First, the claim-
ant must have suffered a loss, injury, or damage that is legally recognizable.23
Second, the defendant’s conduct must be negligent and in breach of the stan-
dard of care set out by the law.24  Third, the court must find a legally recog-
nized duty owed by the defendant to the claimant to avoid the damage
suffered.25  Fourth, the damage suffered by the complainant must be caused by
the negligent conduct of the defendant.26  Last, the damage must be caused, in
fact and in law, by the defendant’s actions or omissions.27
For problem gamblers to ground a cause of action in negligence against
casinos (a novel action in itself), a court must be satisfied that:
1. the loss suffered by the gamblers is a legally recognizable loss;
2. the casino owed a duty of care to the problem gamblers;
3. a reasonable standard of care has been breached by the casino;
4. the casino caused the loss suffered by the pathological gamblers; and
21 Hanke v. Resurfice Corp., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, 2007 SCC 7, para. 6 (Can.).
22 See generally Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Reg’l Police Servs. Bd., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129
(Can.) (analyzing the tort of negligent investigation, including the duty of care, standard of
care, loss or damage, and causal connection); Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643
(Can.) (analyzing the duty of care, including foreseeability and failure to act); Odhavji Estate
v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, para 44 (Can.) (“In order for an action in negligence to
succeed, a plaintiff must be able to establish three things: (i) that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care, (ii) that the defendant breached that duty of care, and (iii) that
damages resulted from that breach.”); Edwards v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2001] 3
S.C.R. 562 (Can.) (considering whether a duty of care will be recognized in a particular case
and whether under the circumstances, reasonably foreseeable harm and proximity can be
found to establish a prima facie duty of care).
23 Hill, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 at para. 90 (“To establish a cause of action in negligence, the
plaintiff must show that he or she suffered compensable damage.  Not all damage will justify
recovery in negligence.”).
24 Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (Can.) (discussing whether a statutory regulator
owes a private law duty of care to members of the investing public for negligence in failing
to properly oversee the conduct of a mortgage broker licensed by the regulator).
25 Fullowka v. Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd., [2010] 2010 SCC 5 (Can.) (on the duty of care
of the Government and private security company to temporary workers during a strike).
26 Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333 at para. 21 (“First, the basic test for determining causation
remains the ‘but for’ test.  This applies to multi-cause injuries.  The plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that ‘but for’ the negligent act or omission of each defendant, the injury would
not have occurred.  Having done this, contributory negligence may be apportioned, as per-
mitted by statute.”).
27 Mustapha v. Culligan of Can. Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, para. 12, 2008 SCC 27 (Can.)
(“The remoteness inquiry asks whether ‘the harm [is] too unrelated to the wrongful conduct
to hold the defendant fairly liable’ . . . . [T]he principle has been that ‘it is the foresight of the
reasonable man which alone can determine responsibility’ . . . .”).
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5. the casino was the sufficiently proximate cause of the loss suffered by
the  problem gamblers.
A. A Legally Recognizable Loss?
Losses in tort law stem from the truism that “the essential purpose of tort
law . . . is to restore the plaintiff to the position he or she would have enjoyed
but for the negligence of the defendant.”28  The plaintiff, however, must not be
placed in a position better than his or her original one.  It is the difference
between the “original position” and the “injured position” that is identified as
the plaintiff’s loss.  Thus, the underlying “condition” of problem gamblers (or
even the pathological gambler) must not have occurred before they began gam-
bling at the casino in question because the “harm” for problem and pathological
gamblers is the underlying condition itself and not the pure economic loss.29
The underlying condition must be caused by the defendant’s alleged
negligence.30
In the case of problem, or even pathological gamblers, the economic loss
must be causally connected to the underlying condition, and that “condition”
must be caused by the gambling facility.  The financial loss of problem gam-
blers is characterized as a “pure economic loss” (i.e. a loss suffered by an indi-
vidual that is not accompanied by a physical injury or property damage).31
Purely economic losses are usually not recoverable under the common law due
to problems with compensating an indeterminate number of defendants, for an
indeterminate amount of time.  However, the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., recognized
five different categories of negligence claims for which a duty of care has been
found with respect to purely economic losses:
1. The Independent Liability of Statutory Public Authorities;
2. Negligent Misrepresentation;
3. Negligent Performance of a Service;
4. Negligent Supply of Shoddy Goods or Structures; and
28 Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, para 20. (Can.).
29 Brooks v. Canadian Pac. Ry., [2007] 283 D.L.R. (4th) 540 (Can.). Brooks sets out many
of the rationales clearly:
The law has always treated negligently inflicted pure economic loss differently from consequent-
ial economic loss.
. . . .
. . . The loss of the use and enjoyment of one’s property is economic loss  . . . . [T]he plaintiffs’
claim as pled in this regard is clearly a claim for pure economic loss and not consequential
economic loss.
. . . .
The common law has been reluctant to find a duty of care to avoid causing foreseeable pure
economic loss for policy reasons. By definition, such losses are not the direct result of the
defendants’ actions.
Id. at paras. 61-62, 83.
30 See discussion infra Parts III.C and III.D (discussing causation and proximity).
31 See Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (Can.). See
also Robert G. Belliveau & Kevin Gibson, Dangerous Defects and Claims for Pure Eco-
nomic Loss, Apr. 14, 2009, available at http://mcinnescooper.com/index.cfm?cm=News&
ce=details&primaryKey=27349 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (offering a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the English and Canadian authorities in this area).
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5. Relational Economic Loss.32
In that case, Justice McLachlin (as she was then), adopted an approach for
determining whether recovery for purely economic losses in novel actions
should be permitted by the courts, asking:
1. Is there a duty relationship sufficient to support recovery?; and
2. Is the extension desirable from a practical point of view, i.e., does it
serve useful purposes or, on the other hand, open the floodgates to
unlimited liability?33
Even if a problem gambler’s purely economic losses could fit under one of
the five categories in Canadian National Railway, it would not satisfy Justice
McLachlan’s elements since it would not cure or prevent the underlying “con-
dition” of problem gambling (or pathological gambling, for that matter).  It
would also “mark a radical extension of the neighbor principle, with significant
consequences for theories of responsibility . . . .”34 This type of extension
would create a duty to an indeterminate group of individuals and create an
unlimited liability for casinos to all possible problem gamblers.  Such an exten-
sion would defeat the cardinal purpose of finding a duty of care, which is “to
take all due care and to carry safely as far as reasonable care and forethought
can attain that end.”35
In their article, “Do Ontario and its Gaming Venues Owe a Duty of Care
to Problem Gamblers?,”36 authors Sasso and Kalajdzic attempt to draw an
analogy between the liability of commercial hosts to intoxicated patrons37 and
the liability of casinos to their patrons, specifically, problem gamblers.  In her
comprehensive response to this analogy, Professor Jamie Cameron concludes
that “gaming venues do not have the same capacity to identify problem gam-
blers as bar hosts do to assess whether a patron is intoxicated. . . .  [A]ny
analogy between intoxicated patrons and problem gamblers is flawed, and
unhelpful as a result.”38
Where a prima facie duty of care cannot be established by analogy to an
already decided case,39 it must be established using the approach initially set
out by the English House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London Borough Coun-
cil40 (the “Anns test”) – and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Cooper v. Hobart.41  Professor Cameron applies the Anns test to Sasso and
32 Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 at para 160.
33 Id. at para. 31 (citing Nielsen v. Kamloops (City), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (Can.)).
34 Cameron, supra note 4, at 555.
35 Kauffman v. Toronto Transit Comm’n, [1960] S.C.R. 251, 255 (Can.) (emphasis added).
36 Sasso & Kalajdzic, supra note 3.
37 See Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow, [1974] S.C.R. 239, 248-49 (Can.).
38 Cameron, supra note 4, at 559.
39 Mustapha v. Culligan of Can. Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, para. 5, 2008 SCC 27 (Can.) (“In
many cases, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is of a type which has
already been judicially recognized as giving rise to a duty of care.  In such cases, precedent
determines the question of duty of care and it is unnecessary to undertake a full-fledged duty
of care analysis.  As stated by A. M. Linden and B. Feldthusen, categories of relationships
that have been recognized and relationships analogous to such pre-established categories
need not be tested by the Anns formula . . . .”) (citation omitted)).
40 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728, 751-52 (H.L.).
41 Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, para. 30, 2001 SCC 79 (Can.).  The court
remarked:
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Kalajdzic’s claim that problem gamblers are owed a duty of care by gaming
facilities.42  Cameron explains that “any prima facie duty of care that could be
established would likely be negated for policy reasons” and that “there is no
precedent for a claim that seeks recovery for the economic losses incurred by
problem gamblers.”43  Cameron concludes that there is no reasonable proxim-
ity between the gambler and the gaming facility in order to create a duty of
care:  “the gaming industry is not capable of assessing a person’s urge to gam-
ble, evaluating the connection between the speed and size of bets and the exis-
tence of a problem, or drawing a line between reckless behavior and problem
gambling.”44
B. What is the Standard of Care?
Sasso and Kalajdzic suggest that gaming facilities have the ability to mon-
itor their patrons for “problem” behaviour.45  However, monitoring casino
patrons for all possible signs of problem gambling “would require a physician,
psychologist, nurse, or social worker to analyze such patterns of behaviour and
provide the casino with a preliminary diagnosis of all suspected problem gam-
blers.”46  The serious privacy implications of this have been subject to scrutiny
in earlier works.47
This may deal with the concern of policing problem gamblers (writ large),
but self-identified problem gamblers present their own difficulties.  These gam-
blers have signed a self-exclusion agreement with the casino whereby the
casino undertakes to exclude them on future visits.  Indeed, if the duty of care
is understood as being to one’s neighbour (i.e. persons so closely affected by
the acts or omissions that we ought to reasonably have had them in contempla-
tion when so acting or failing to act),48 then the Release and List49 comes
closer to bringing the problem gambler into the definition of neighbour.50
At the first stage of the Anns test, two questions arise:  (1) was the harm that occurred the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act? and (2) are there reasons, notwith-
standing the proximity between the parties established in the first part of this test, that tort liabil-
ity should not be recognized here?  The proximity analysis involved at the first stage of the Anns
test focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
These factors include questions of policy, in the broad sense of that word.  If foreseeability and
proximity are established at the first stage, a prima facie duty of care arises.  At the second stage
of the Anns test, the question still remains whether there are residual policy considerations
outside the relationship of the parties that may negative the imposition of a duty of care.
Id. (emphasis in original).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 561.
44 Id. at 564.  Indeed, the remaining sections on the tortious liability of casinos to problem
gamblers presumes that we can overcome all of the objections raised by Professor Cameron
about extending a duty of care in the first place. See generally id. at 560-71 (describing why
it would be unsound to impose a duty of care on casinos to problem gamblers).
45 See Sasso & Kalajdzic, supra note 3, at 556-57.
46 Mohammed, supra note 4, at 342 (emphasis in original).
47 See, e.g., Mohammed, supra note 4.
48 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (H.L.) (referencing Lord Atkin’s famous
formulation of the neighbour principle).
49 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
50 Mohammed, supra note 4.
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However, the standard of care for that alleged duty is one of reasonable
surveillance.51  The standard recognizes that humans are imperfect.52  No sur-
veillance system can completely exclude unwanted guests or trespassers, other-
wise, we would not be having this debate.  So, even if casinos owe a duty of
care to self-identified problem gamblers, the standard of that duty is still that of
“reasonable surveillance.”  There is still no liability in tort if the casino did all
that it could reasonably do (given human frailty and imperfection) to prevent
problem gamblers from their own actions.  As airport and national security
have demonstrated time and time again, even the most rigorous forms of sur-
veillance are prone to human error, oversight, deception, cunning, and
imperfection.
Even if casinos’ security personnel were held to be professionals at sur-
veillance, perhaps akin to airport surveillance, it still does not necessarily make
them liable.  This is especially true if it can be demonstrated that self-identified
problem gamblers as a “class,” or a particular problem gambler, have been
removed from the gaming venue on several occasions.  This would demonstrate
that gaming venues are exercising their alleged duty of care in a reasonable and
diligent manner, albeit imperfectly.
C. But Who Caused the Loss?
Assume for the moment that problem gamblers can establish a duty of care
either as an un-indentified class or as self-identified problem gamblers.  Also
assume that the casinos have no defences available to them and such gamblers
can recover purely economic losses.  There must still be a linkage between the
casino’s actions (or omissions) and the harm/loss suffered by problems
gamblers.
To establish causation, the “but for” test, as stated in Hanke v. Resurfice
Corp., must be applied.53 This test “ensures that a defendant will not be held
51 The “man on the Clapham omnibus” standard is said to apply to situations involving
ordinary people.  Where someone holds themselves out to hold a special skill, then the stan-
dard is that of a reasonable person in that profession or calling (even a chimney-sweep is
considered a “calling,” so we have no doubt that casino surveillance is a profession as well).
In Canada v. Blue Peter Steamships Co., [1974] F.C.J. No. 314 (Nfld. F.C.T.D.) (QL), the
court adopted Professor Winfield’s formulation of the reasonable person as set forth in WIN-
FIELD ON TORTS, (8th ed. 1967) (emphasis added):
Lord Bowen visualised the reasonable man as “the man on the Clapham omnibus”:  an American
writer as “the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn mower
in his shirt sleeves.”  He has not the courage of Achilles, the wisdom of Ulysses or the strength
of Hercules, nor has he “the prophetic vision of a clairvoyant”.  He will not anticipate folly in all
its forms, but he never puts out of consideration the teachings of experience and so will guard
against the negligence of others when experience shows such negligence to be common. He is a
reasonable man but he is not a perfect citizen.  This is good so far as it goes, but it must be
added that where a person exercises any calling, the law requires him, in dealing with other
people in the course of that calling, to exhibit the degree of skill or competence which is usually
associated with its efficient discharge. Nobody expects the man on the Clapham omnibus to have
any skill as a surgeon, a lawyer, a docker, or a chimney-sweep unless he is one; but if he
professes to be one, then the law requires him to show such skill as any ordinary member of the
profession or calling to which he belongs, or claims to belong, would display.
52 Id.
53 Hanke v. Resurfice Corp., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, 2007 SCC 7, para. 21 (Can.).
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liable for the plaintiff’s injuries where they ‘may very well be due to factors
unconnected to the defendant . . . .’”54 The court must conclude that the loss
would not have occurred “but for” the conduct of the defendant.55 If the court
determines this in the affirmative, then the defendant’s actions or omissions can
be said to be the cause of the plaintiff’s loss.56 If the damage would have
occurred in any event, with or without the act of the defendant, then the con-
duct is not the cause of the damage.57 The defendant’s act must make a differ-
ence; if it had nothing to do with the loss, then no liability can be imposed.58
A recent study conducted at the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology sought to identify the probable risk factors that lead to the develop-
ment and maintenance of pathological gambling.59 The study identified,
reviewed, and integrated seven studies in its analysis of pathological gambling
risk factors.60  The study concluded that the well established risk factors for the
development and maintenance of pathological gambling were:  age, gender, the
illusion of control, availability of plays, sensory characteristics, schedules of
reinforcement, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), alcoholism, and other
drug abuse.61 The study listed the probable risk factors for the development62
(and maintenance) of pathological gambling as:  employment status, social wel-
fare status, urban residence, low academic achievement, immigrants, heart rate
arousal, transmitter activity, genetic studies, erroneous perceptions, age of
onset, rapid onset, depression, anxiety, personality disorders, coping styles,
impulsivity, and sensation seeking.63
Reviewing the factors outlined in the study, it cannot be said that a
casino’s failure to monitor patrons for signs of pathological gambling64 or its
failure to expel self-identified problem gamblers65 (on a balance of probabili-
ties) causes problem gambling.  Indeed, even if casinos were to monitor
patrons using clinical psychiatrists and psychologists and/or exclude problem
gamblers using the utmost standard of surveillance, gamblers would still
develop problem gambling behaviours (or “risks”).  Indeed, to establish causa-
tion, the court must find probable cause, not just a possible cause.66 It would
therefore be impossible to find that the acts or omissions of gaming facilities
are the probable cause of a serious impulse control disorder that has many
known causes and risk factors.  Professor Cameron identifies that “problem
54 Id. at para. 23 (quoting Justice Sopinka in Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 (Can.)).
55 Id. at para. 21.
56 Id. at para. 23.
57 Horsley v. MacLaren, [1972] S.C.R. 441, 444-45 (Can.); see generally Athey v. Leonati,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 (Can.) (discussing the “but for” and “material contribution” tests).
58 Horsley, [1972] S.C.R. 441, at 444-45; Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 326-7.
59 See Agneta Johansson et al., Risk Factors for Problematic Gambling:  A Critical Litera-
ture Review, 25 J. GAMBLING STUDY 67 (2009).
60 Id. at 68-69.
61 Id. at 78.
62 We should note that pathological gambling is the “high water” mark for problem gam-
bling.  Therefore, this study is also useful in distilling many of the general components of
problem gambling as well.
63 Johansson et al., supra note 59, at 78.
64 Sasso & Kalajdzic, supra note 3, at 563.
65 Id. at 564.
66 Mustapha v. Culligan of Can. Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, para. 13, 2008 SCC 27 (Can.).
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gamblers can gain access to a variety of gaming opportunities that are not man-
aged by the OLGC [the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation67], such as
casinos in Quebec or the state of New York, and on the Internet.”68
The foregoing analysis presumes that the courts follow the traditional “but
for” approach to causation.  In exceptional situations, courts will deviate from
this approach where the defendant “materially contributed” to the plaintiff’s
loss or injury.  This “material contribution” test, as discussed in Resurfice, only
applies if two requirements are met.69  First, it must be impossible, due to fac-
tors outside of the plaintiff’s control, for the plaintiff to prove that the defen-
dant’s negligent action caused the plaintiff’s loss by using the “but for” test.70
Second, “it must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of [loss], and the
plaintiff must have suffered that form of [loss].”71  The plaintiff’s loss must
“fall within the ambit of the risk created by the defendant’s breach.”72
The material contribution test fails to prove causation of problem gam-
bling by way of acts or omissions by gaming facilities because, as we (and
Professor Cameron) have already explained, there is no duty of care between
problem gamblers and gaming facilities.  In sum, casinos do not cause problem
gambling.
D. Proximity
Even if problem gamblers could establish that gaming facilities owe them
a duty of care for harm caused by the casino resulting in a recognizable loss, it
is unlikely that problem gamblers could establish sufficient proximity to ground
their claims in negligence.
Proximity, or the neighbour principle, was famously set out by Lord Atkin
in Donoghue v. Stevenson.73  It is recognition of the need to protect:  “persons
who are so closely and directly affected by [our] act[s] that [we] ought reasona-
bly to have them in contemplation as being so affected when [we are] directing
[our] mind[s] to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”74
In this case, there is simply no proximity between problem gamblers (writ
large) and casinos, since the casinos “have no direct knowledge of those who
choose not to self-exclude, are not capable of diagnosing problem gambling,
and are not in a relationship of sufficient proximity to unidentified problem
gamblers to establish a prima facie duty of care.”75
Although not strictly an element of proximity, it is also relevant to con-
sider the remoteness of the damage because it could be argued that problem
67 The OLGC is the provincial agency created by the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corpora-
tion Act, 1999, and charged with operating and managing lotteries, casinos, and racetrack
slot facilities throughout Ontario.  Ontario Lottery & Gaming Corp. Act, 1999 S.O., ch. 12,
§ 3 (Can.).
68 Cameron, supra note 4, at 563.
69 Hanke v. Resurfice Corp., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, para. 24, 2007 SCC 7 (Can.).
70 Id. at para. 25.
71 Id.
72 Id. 
73 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
74 Id. at 580.
75 Cameron, supra note 4, at 565.
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gambling (especially pathological gambling) is an unreasonable psychological
harm, and therefore not reasonably foreseeable by casinos.  The forseeability of
these types of harms was recently explained by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd. as a “loss suffered by the plaintiff . . .
[that] was too remote to be reasonably foreseen and that consequently, [the
plaintiff could not] recover damages from the defendant.”76  As Nicole Mangan
explained, “[t]he [Culligan] decision carefully assessed the meaning of per-
sonal injury and whether the psychological conditions claimed qualified as
injuries.  The principles are appropriate for all unexpected personal injuries.”77
The limits of recovery for such remote psychological damages were also
stated in the English case of White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire
Police, where the court reasoned that “[t]he law expects reasonable fortitude
and robustness of its citizens and will not impose liability for the exceptional
frailty of certain individuals.”78  The Supreme Court of Canada further elabo-
rated on these limits in Mustapha, stating that “unusual or extreme reactions to
events caused by negligence are imaginable but not reasonably foreseeable. . . .
[T]he law of tort imposes an obligation to compensate for any harm done on the
basis of reasonable foresight, not as insurance.”79
Indeed, there are many patrons who frequent casinos often (the authors
included), who do not become problem gamblers (or pathological gamblers).  It
is clear that these disorders can be classified as unusual and extreme “reac-
tions,” and therefore, do not fall within the gambit of reasonably foreseeable
harms relating to gaming.  They are precisely the types of psychological disor-
ders that would fall within the limitation described by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Culligan.
But what about self-excluded problem gamblers?80  Would their self-
exclusion make their losses more foreseeable with respect to proximate cause
and remoteness?  As Sasso and Kalajdzic explain, “there will be problem gam-
76 Mustapha v. Culligan of Can. Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, para. 20, 2008 SCC 27 (Can.).
77 Nicole Mangan, The Fly in the Water Bottle:  How Mustapha Modifies the ‘Thin Skull’
Rule, THE LAW. WKLY., Sept. 5, 2008, at 10, 11.
78 White v. Chief Constable of S. Yorkshire Police, (1998) 2 A.C. 455.
79 Mustapha, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114 at para. 16.  Although, the Supreme Court did note that
where the “defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s particular sensibilities, the ordi-
nary fortitude requirement need not be applied strictly.  If the evidence demonstrates that the
defendant knew that the plaintiff was of less than ordinary fortitude, the plaintiff’s injury
may have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” Id. at para. 17.  This may suggest
an avenue of recovery for self-identified problem gamblers who can demonstrate some form
of psychological injury that rises above “mere” high frequency gambling:
[A] plaintiff who suffers personal injury will be found to have suffered damage.  Damage for
purposes of this inquiry includes psychological injury.  The distinction between physical and
mental injury is elusive and arguably artificial in the context of tort. . . . This said, psychological
disturbance that rises to the level of personal injury must be distinguished from psychological
upset.  Personal injury at law connotes serious trauma or illness . . . .  The law does not recognize
upset, disgust, anxiety, agitation or other mental states that fall short of injury.  I would not
purport to define compensable injury exhaustively, except to say that it must be serious and
prolonged and rise above the ordinary annoyances, anxieties and fears that people living in soci-
ety routinely, if sometimes reluctantly, accept.
Id. at paras. 8, 9.
80 Note here we are specifically talking about self-identified pathological gamblers.
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blers who have identified themselves as such to the casino management and/or
employees and have either sought their assistance through the execution of the
Self-Exclusion Form or in some other manner.”81  However, persons can vol-
untarily self-exclude themselves from casinos without necessarily being prob-
lem gamblers (or even pathological gamblers) in the clinical sense.  Further,
these self-identified problem gamblers may not necessarily meet the clinical
criteria set out in DSM-IV-TR or the PGSI for problem gamblers and patholog-
ical gamblers.  Therefore, if clinically diagnosed pathological gamblers are not
owed a duty of care by gaming facilities, then, prima facie, self-identified prob-
lem gamblers should not be owed a duty of care by the gaming facilities.  For
these (non-pathological) problem gamblers, Professor Cameron explains that:
Those who self-identify and sign the form choose whether to respect the ban or to
violate it by seeking access to gaming facilities.  The gambler has accepted responsi-
bility for his or her own behavior and is made aware, by the process and the terms of
the form, that he or she cannot rely on the facility for protection from problem gam-
bling.  In those circumstances, there can be no proximity under Anns, and no prima
facie duty of care, for problem gamblers who have self-excluded.82
“True” pathological gamblers who self-exclude, however, do not have the
ability to control their impulses.83  Unless pathological gamblers expressly
identify themselves as such at the time of self-exclusion, the extreme reaction
to gaming facilities that they experience is not the type of foreseeable harm that
is proximately caused by the actions or omissions of gaming facilities.  If at the
time of self-exclusion, pathological gamblers do indeed identify themselves as
suffering from a clinical inability to control their gambling impulses, then the
foreseeability of the harm may be satisfied from a tort perspective; but this is
where the contract issues become especially important.84
Nonetheless, despite the slight caveat outlined above, all of the elements
of the tort of negligence do not appear available to problem gamblers.  Permit-
ting a claim of this sort is not only novel, but would be bewildering to tort law
principles.
E. The Defences in Tort
Even if all of the elements of the tort of negligence are satisfied, all of
main defences to a claim in negligence appear applicable.
Because self-identified problem gamblers are implicitly consenting to the
risks involved in their gambling, it would seem that the casino could avail itself
of the defence of volenti non fit injuria, or the voluntary assumption of risk.
Having been placed on the List, self-identified problem gamblers have under-
stood and implicitly consented to any risk of injury.  One could argue that self-
identified pathological gamblers can never truly consent to the risks of their
gambling because of the nature of their mental illness.  However, the criminal
jurisprudence on pathological gamblers is frank in this regard.  In R. v. Reshke,
Justice Moreau commented that he was:
81 Sasso & Kalajdzic, supra note 3, at 562-63.
82 Cameron, supra note 4, at 565.
83 See supra Part II (discussing the distinction between problem gambling and pathological
gambling).
84 See infra Part V.
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satisfied that Mr. Reshke’s [pathological] gambling addiction fueled the procurement
card fraud and the creation of false contracts either directly or indirectly. Having said
that, although the offences were the products of an impulsive nature and were fueled
by addictions, they cannot themselves be described as impulsive or spontaneous as
they extended to a number of transactions over an extended period of time. His con-
tract scheme [of awarding fraudulent consulting contracts, through his position in the
Alberta government, to persons he was indebted to, or to persons he gambled with]
was deliberate, well-planned and repeated.85
Even though this case was within the context of a criminal fraud proceed-
ing, the same level of self-accountability can be said to extend to pathological
gamblers who systematically seek out and obtain new lines of credit, evade
security, and continue their gambling (thereby trespassing – criminally and
civilly – on casino property).86
Returning to the defences available to the casino, self-identified problem
gamblers could also be said to contribute to any alleged negligence on the
casino’s part by entering the gaming venue and continuing to gamble.  The
casino, in a perverse way, would only be negligent for failing to detect, or
enforce, the trespass of the problem gambler onto its premises.  Any losses that
self-identified problem gamblers incur would be a result of their actions.  On
some level, there ought to be some measure of responsibility on the part of self-
85 R. v. Reshke, [2004] 358 A.R. 63, para. 53 (Can.) (emphasis added).
86 See also R. v. Oates, [2008] 318 Sask. R. 129, paras. 53-54 (Can.) (“[T]he casino records
reflect a serious problem gambler and possibly an addiction.  I am, for the purposes of sen-
tencing, prepared to accept that Ms. Oates did have a gambling addiction. This addiction
will diminish her responsibility somewhat in my decision on an appropriate sentence - but it
cannot unduly limit her personal responsibility for her actions.”) (emphasis added)).  This
can be contrasted with Justice Belanger’s dicta in R. v. Dulmage, [2003] O.J. No. 3834 (J.
Ct.) (Can.) (concerning a member of the Armed Forces who stole from his employer to
support his gambling addition) where he writes that:
It seems to me that we must keep that perspective in mind, that the Federal, Provincial and
indeed Municipal authorities bear some collective responsibility for the creation of (and I use this
word guardedly) “The Monster”; you know, the gambling addict, the gambling personality.
Therefore when a person like you has fallen prey to a government sponsored enterprise, the
government ought to bear its share of responsibility, and ought perhaps to be . . . less strident in
its insistence, that people who fall prey to this addiction be jailed because they have resorted to
illegal means to obtain funds.
The same might be said, for example, if the government were to sponsor the sale of cocaine,
albeit it is certainly an addiction on a different scale.
Id. at paras. 7-9.
It is clear that Justice Belanger is speaking in the context of the Crown asking for a protracted
incarceration of an individual based on the frauds he committed in support of his addiction.
With respect, Justice Belanger’s emotive reference to cocaine is perhaps an empty analogy.  A
more suitable analogy would be the Government’s restriction and licensing of the sale of alcohol.
Would Justice Belanger advocate that the Government share in the blameworthiness of
alcoholics who kill or seriously injure another in support of their addiction?  Or while driving?
The authors seriously doubt it.
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identified problem gamblers.87  After all, problem gamblers do not become
mindless automatons due to their illness.88
Even if the problem gambler cannot be seen to be contributorily negligent,
gaming facilities could also raise the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur
actio, a doctrine that prevents recovery when claimants themselves were
involved in a wrongful act.  Since self-identified problem gamblers have com-
mitted a trespass, the law should not aid them in recovering their losses since it
would be unjustly enriching problem gamblers for their trespass.  Although the
Supreme Court of Canada curtailed the use of this doctrine for actions in negli-
gence,89 in Hall v. Hebert, Justice McLachlin, (as she was then) writing for the
majority, specifically noted that:
[o]ne situation in which there seems to be a clear role for the doctrine is the case
where to allow the plaintiff’s tort claim would be to permit the plaintiff to profit from
his or her wrong.
. . . .
87 The earlier criminal jurisprudence appears to support this contention.  A particularly
insightful account of this view is offered by the late, and venerable, Shannon Bybee in
Problem Gambling:  One View from the Gaming Industry Side, 4 J. GAMBLING BEHAV.  301
(1988). The abstract alone is quite telling:
An experienced lawyer for the gaming industry argues that the very appellation of “compulsive
gambling” is misleading. Advocates of the medical model of compulsive gambling have created
a strange new disease, where individuals are viewed as not responsible for their misdeeds but as
solely responsible for their own cure. The fact that some individuals have problems because of
gambling does not lead to the conclusion that casinos bear the ultimate legal or moral responsi-
bility. More research and dialogue is needed; but so is the acceptance by problem gamblers and
those who study and treat them that individuals have to take responsibility for their own conduct.
Id. at 301.
88 We appreciate that in some rare cases, as in R. v. Horvath, the pathological gambler may
indeed come close to automatism.  R. v. Horvath, [1997] 152 Sask. R. 277 (Can.).  In
Horvath, the judge described the pathological gambler as:
[O]ne of the worst cases of a pathological gambler he had ever seen. When asked where he [the
psychiatric nurse who diagnosed the defendant] would put the respondent on a scale of one to
ten, he replied:
Oh, I’d put her about nine point five. I don’t like putting anybody at ten. Probably the
closest thing to ten. She has a – she has a severe gambling problem.
He was of the view that she would have no difficulty losing $400.00 an hour.
Id. at para. 8.
However, such a case may be contrasted with the case in R. v. Oates, [2008] 318 Sask.
R. 129 (Can.):
Here, as in Horvath, supra, the accused has been diagnosed with having a pathological gambling
problem.  However, unlike Horvath, Ms. Oates [the defendant pathological gambler] was not
experiencing extensive indebtedness from gambling.  It did not appear that she diminished her
personal resources to any significant extent to gamble, relying rather on the government’s money
which she obtained unlawfully.  Having said that, [the defendant pathological gambler] asserts
that she did refinance her home and take out a line of credit, the proceeds of which were used
primarily for gambling.  Her family relationships were not disrupted.  She experiences a strong
and supportive family, who apparently knew nothing of her gambling problems or her crime.
She also apparently has many friends who did not know anything about her addiction or her
criminal activity.  She did not neglect her work and she was held in high esteem by other mem-
bers of the various organizations she supported and worked for.
Id. at para. 52.
89 PHILIP OSBORNE, THE LAW OF TORTS 112 (3d ed. 2007).
\\server05\productn\N\nvg\1-1\NVG104.txt unknown Seq: 15 18-JUN-10 10:39
Spring 2010] REWARDING TRESPASS & OTHER ENIGMAS 113
Its use is justified where allowing the plaintiff’s claim would introduce inconsistency
into the fabric of the law, either by permitting the plaintiff to profit from an illegal or
wrongful act, or to evade a penalty prescribed by criminal law. Its use is not justified
where the plaintiff’s claim is merely for compensation for personal injuries sustained
as a consequence of the negligence of the defendant.90
Hall is therefore a restriction on the use of the doctrine where personal
injuries are sustained.  However, the doctrine is still applicable to the situation
where the problem gambler has committed a civil and criminal wrong by tres-
passing and entering the gaming venue, loses money, and then seeks to recover
purely economic losses from that illegal trespass.91
IV. THE DECISION IN TREYES V. OLGC
In Treyes v. Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corp. (“OLGC”), Justice Mac-
donald remarked, albeit in obiter, that Sasso and Kalajdzic’s article
“address[ed] many, if not all, of the issues that arise” in this area.92  With
respect, we have demonstrated that this is a complex (and novel) area of tort
liability.  Sasso and Kalajdzic may have sown the seeds, but the fertile dialogue
has only now begun.
Another interesting aspect of Treyes is the claimant himself.  He suffered
from Parkinson’s disease for many years, and “[a]s a result of the medications
prescribed to treat the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, Mr. Treyes became a
pathological gambler and was diagnosed as a pathological gambler in 1999.”93
Indeed, a recent study has confirmed a link between Parkinson’s disease, its
treatment, and problem gambling (including pathological gambling):
“[p]athological gambling (PG) has been indentified in patients with Parkinson’s
disease (PD) treated with dopamine agonists suggesting that dysregulation of
brain dopaminergic activity may contribute to the development of gambling
90 Hall v. Herbert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, paras. 11, 25 (Can.) (emphasis added).
91 Sasso & Kalajdzic, supra note 3, at 567-68 (acknowledging the inherent difficulties of
recovering purely economic losses); Cameron, supra note 4, at 570 (Professor Cameron has
also drawn attention to this, noting the difficulty of recovering purely economic losses, as
well as the overall problem it presents for fashioning a remedy for litigious problem
gamblers).
92 Treyes v. Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corp., [2007] O.J. No. 2772, para. 12 (J. Ct.)
(Can.).  The full paragraph reads:
Before I deal with the legal questions posed in this case, I comment on a recent and comprehen-
sive article that the Plaintiffs included as an exhibit on this motion:  William V. Sasso and
Jasminda Kolajdzic [sic], “Do Ontario and Its Gaming Venues Owe a Duty of Care to Problem
Gamblers?” (2006) 10 Gaming L. Rev. at 552.  The article addresses many, if not all, of the
issues that arise in cases such as this one including the Voluntary Self Exclusion Program under-
taken by the OLGC, and the duty of care of gaming venues.  The authors conclude at page 570:
The ramifications of [Edmonds v. Laplante (15 March 2005), Toronto 02/CV226280 (Ont.
S.C.J.)] remain to be seen.  Will other courts, including appellate courts, follow Edmonds?
What steps could the OLGC take to meet its duty of care?  For the time being, at least one
question has probably been answered by Edmonds:  Do Ontario and its gaming venues owe
a duty of care to problem gamblers?  Under the current state of the law, the answer would
appear to be “yes”.
Id.
93 Id. at para. 3.
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problems.”94  This adds another layer of complexity to the causality issue,
because according to this study, and by the court’s own admission, it was the
Parkinson’s disease – or at least the underlying neuropathology – that “caused”
the pathological gambling.95  In other words – akin to bars and alcoholism –
casinos may not be the cause of pathological gambling, but are merely outlets
for its manifestation.
V. THE LIABILITY IN CONTRACT TO PROBLEM GAMBLERS
Under Ontario’s voluntary self-exclusion program, “Request to be Placed
on a List of Self-Excluded Persons and Release,” it is problem gamblers who
self-identify and sign an undertaking that they wish to be excluded from all
Ontario gaming venues for an indefinite period of time.96  This is the offer; the
problem gambler is the promisee.  The gaming venue – and the OLGC – then
undertake to remove the problem gamblers from their mailing lists and deny
them the ability to participate in player programs or other promotions.97  This is
the acceptance; the gaming venue is the promisor.
A. Consideration
Thomas v. Thomas represents one of the oldest truisms in contract law on
consideration. Justice Patteson famously noted the following:
[c]onsideration means something which is of some value in the eye of the law, mov-
ing from the plaintiff [i.e. the promisee]:  it may be some benefit to the plaintiff, or
some detriment to the defendant [i.e. the promisor]; but at all events it must be mov-
ing from the plaintiff.98
With respect to the self-exclusion Release, there is no consideration which
moves from the problem gambler to the gaming venue (let alone “at all times”).
It is the gaming venue which undertakes a gratuitous promise to keep the prob-
94 Crockford et al., supra note 6, at 411.
95 Accordingly, the OLGC was not the cause of Mr. Treyes’ pathological gamblng.  Section
3 of the OLGC Act provides that:
The following are the objects of the [Ontario Lottery and Gaming] Corporation:
1.  To develop, undertake, organize, conduct and manage lottery schemes on behalf of Her
Majesty in right of Ontario.
2.  To provide for the operation of gaming premises.
3.  To ensure that gaming premises are operated and managed in accordance with this Act
and the Gaming Control Act, 1992 and the regulations made under the Acts.
4.  To provide for the operation of any business that the Corporation considers to be reason-
ably related to operating a gaming premises, including any business that offers goods and
services to persons who play games of chance in a gaming premises.
5.  If authorized by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, to enter into agreements to develop,
undertake, organize, conduct and manage lottery schemes on behalf of, or in conjunction
with, the government of one or more provinces of Canada.
6.  To do such other things as the Lieutenant Governor in Council may by order direct.
Ontario Lottery & Gaming Corp. Act, 1999 S.O., ch. 12, § 3 (Can.).
96 Release, supra note 2.
97 Id.; see also Cameron, supra note 4, at 559 and n.47.
98 Thomas v. Thomas, (1842) 114 Eng. Rep. 330, 333-34 (Q.B.) (emphasis added).
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lem gambler from entering the venue.  There is nothing which the problem
gambler adds to the bargain.99
Even if one could argue that the “right” to enter a gaming venue is the
valuable consideration which the problem gambler is surrendering in exchange
for exclusion from such gaming venues, such a notional form of consideration
lacks sufficiency and certainty.  No economic value could reasonably be
attached to a notional “right” to enter a gaming venue.100
If courts create some type of consideration in this situation, as they tend to
do,101 it must surely be defective or valueless because pathological gambling
can never be cured.102  Even if it can be said that pathological gamblers have
given consideration in the form of a denial of their rights, such consideration
must fail because pathological gamblers can never “truly” contract out of their
right to enter a gaming venue because that is precisely the incurable impulse we
are dealing with.
B. Capacity
Another vexing issue surrounding the voluntary self-exclusion program is
the very nature of problem gambling itself.  If we accept that problem gam-
bling, especially pathological gambling, is a real and serious mental illness,103
then anyone who voluntary self-excludes on their own initiative must necessa-
rily lack the capacity to form a binding agreement.  There can never be a true
consensus ad idem (meeting of the minds).
If pathological gambling deprives individuals of the ability to control their
impulses towards gambling, how can a contract which seeks to exclude such
people from gambling even be considered enforceable?  Pathological gamblers,
by definition, lack the capacity to understand how to control their impulses.104
99 See Terrafund Financial Inc. v. 569244 B.C. Ltd., [2000] 20 B.L.R. (3d) 104, para. 25
(B.C.S.C.) (Can.) (noting that “[c]onsideration is simply something of value received by a
promisor from a promisee”).  Again, the problem gambler provides nothing “of value” to the
gaming venue by signing the Release.
100 White v. Bluett, (1853) 23 L.J. (N.S.) 36.
101 BRUCE MACDOUGALL, INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACTS 95 (Lexis Nexis Canada 2007).
“[C]ourts have been fairly adept at ‘finding’ consideration, particularly when adequacy is not
a concern, it cannot be found where it cannot, from any perspective, be said to have a value
[i.e. it is valueless].” Id.
102 GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS, SHARING RECOVERY THROUGH GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS 57
(1st ed. 1984) (“although an individual may control the compulsive gambling disorder, one
can never really eliminate the illness from one’s psychological make-up”); see also Gam-
blers Anonymous, Questions & Answers About the Problem of Compulsive Gambling and
the G.A. Recovery Program, http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/qna.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2010) (“compulsive gambling is an illness, progressive in its nature, which can never be
cured, but can be arrested”); JACKIE FERRIS, TANIA STIRPE & ANCA IALOMITEANU, GAM-
BLING IN ONTARIO:  A REPORT FROM A GENERAL POPULATION SURVEY ON GAMBLING-
RELATED PROBLEMS AND OPINIONS 6 (ARF Research Document Series, No. 137 1996)
(“Both the SOGS [South Oaks Gambling Screen] and the DSM-IV criteria assume that gam-
bling is a progressive disorder that can be arrested but never cured, so once someone crosses
the ‘invisible line’ to compulsive or pathological gambling, they are said to have the
disease.”).
103 See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, supra note 7, at
671-74.
104 See Fowler Estate v. Barnes, [1996] 142 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 223, paras. 25-26 (Can.).
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And if the pathological gambler is not responsible, how does a mere self-exclu-
sion Release suddenly shift responsibility to the gaming venue?  Because it is
pathological gamblers’ very illness that is the cause of the problem, they cannot
“contract out” of it.
Pathological gamblers are in no way exercising their free will in “volunta-
rily” self-identifying and entering into such contracts.  One cannot argue that
pathological gambling is a real and serious mental illness while affirming in the
same breath that such mentally ill persons can voluntary self-exclude through
contract.  It is an affront to the dignity and severity of the disorder and other
impulse control disorders.
Even if one accepts the argument that pathological gamblers are capable
of contractually excluding themselves (in law and in fact), the English authori-
ties on mentally incompetent persons suggest that the self-exclusion release is
still voidable (and not void ab initio) at the behest of the pathological gam-
bler.105  This view appears to have been accepted by Canadian Courts.106  This
jurisprudential wisdom is hardly fatal. In fact, when such gamblers re-enter the
gaming venue they purportedly tried to exclude themselves from, this can rea-
sonably be seen as a rescission of the contract.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no liability in tort law, nor the law of contract towards problem
gamblers, including pathological gamblers.  Any cause of action in this regard
would be novel and dangerous, as it would stretch the bounds of basic negli-
gence principles and basic contractual principles to near absurdity.
Indeed, on any legal basis, whether in contract or tort, “policing” problem
gamblers is a very complex policy issue that needs Parliament’s intervention,
wisdom, and full consideration.  The spectrum of “problem gambling” from its
lowest form (“mere” high frequency gambling) through to its most severe form
(pathological gambling) adds many more levels of complexity to the enforce-
ability of the voluntary self-exclusion agreement since there would be varying
degrees of “consent” or “capacity” dependent on the problem gambler’s partic-
ular place in the spectrum.  Should the courts intervene in matters of public
A contract or deed purportedly entered into by a mentally incompetent person is voidable at the
option of that person or somebody acting on his or her behalf, if the following conditions can be
established:
(1) that at the time of execution, she was mentally incompetent;
(2) by reason of such mental incompetence, she was not-capable of understanding the terms
of the document and of forming a rational judgment of its effect upon her interests; and
(3) the other party had knowledge, actual or constructive, of such mental incompetence.
It is not mental incapacity in the abstract with renders the contract liable to be set aside. The
mental incapacity that has this effect must be such that it impairs the ability to contract, that is,
an ability to understand the nature of the transaction being entered into and its general effect.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
105 GERALD HENRY LOUIS FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN CANADA 158-159 (5th ed.
2006) (citing Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q.B. 599 (C.A.) and York Glass Co. v.
Jubb [1925], 134 L.T. 36 (C.A.)).
106 Id. (citing Fyckes v. Chisholm [1911], 3 O.W.N. 21 (Ont. H.C.); Hardman v. Falk
[1955], 3 D.L.R. 129 (B.C.C.A.); Re:  Rogers [1963], 42 W.W.R. 200 (B.C.C.A.); and
Sawatzky v. Sawatzky [1986], 48 Sask. R. 161 (Sask. Q.B.)).
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policy, as they tend to do – whether reluctantly, implicitly, or in the interests of
expediency – the territory should be treaded upon very lightly and with full
appreciation of all competing considerations.  Merely attributing liability,
whether in contract or tort, to Ontario gaming venues simply because it is eco-
nomically, socially, or politically convenient to do so merely strains the rela-
tionship between Ontario’s gaming venues, regulators, and the “class” of
problem gamblers.  The goal should be treatment, not litigation, and responsi-
bility, not liability.
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